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Saikewicz: 
Nontreatment Decisions for Incompetents 
Harold F. Gamble, Ph.D. 
The author is a member of the department of philosophy at St. 
Louis Community College, Meramec. He noted that the comments of 
Norman Fost, John Robertson, Carl Wellman and Daniel Wikler 
greatly improved this article. 
Should we provide chemotherapy for leukemia for Joseph 
Saikewicz, an incurably ill, elderly, severely retarded resident of a 
state institution, whose life may be prolonged for up to a year by such 
care? The case of Superintendent of Belchertown v. Joseph 
Saikewicz,l which discusses this question, seems destined to become a 
classic for debate among lawyers, physicians and philosophers. 2 
I find the decision by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, 
which affirmed the probate court's decision not to treat Saikewicz, 
open to speculation. First, I question that the number of considera-
tions for nontreatment exceeded the considerations for treatment. I 
examine and reject some of the court's considerations for nontreat-
ment, and argue that the court overlooked a consjderation for treat-
ment. Secondly, I doubt that the substituted judgment doctrine, a 
procedure which the court used to discover Saikewicz's wishes, was 
rigorously applied. Finally, I argue that the court did not establish a 
criterion for determining when life is worth living for Saikewicz. 
Hence, the court had no decision procedure for deciding Saikewicz's 
fate when there were an equal number of considerations for and 
against treatment. 
A. Saikewicz's Situation 
Joseph Saikewicz was a 67-year-old, profoundly retarded (I.Q. of 
10 and mental age of approximately two years and eight months), 
long-term inmate (54 years) of state institutions in Massachusetts. 
Although he could not communicate except for gestures and grunts 
and responded only to gestures and physical contact, Saikewicz 
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enjoyed good health until April, 1976, when doctors learned he had 
acute myeloblastic monocytic leukemia - a fatal cancer of the blood. 
The superintendent of Belchertown State School, where Saikewicz 
had resided for the last 48 years, petitioned the probate court for a 
determination about medical treatment. Treatment would involve the 
use of powerful drugs to kill not only leukemia-affected cells, but in 
the process, normal body cells as well. Because of massive, indiscrim-
inate, blood-cell destruction, the onset of chemotherapy usually 
makes the patient much sicker. Side effects of treatment include 
j nausea, vomiting, bladder irritation, numbness and tingling of the 
extremities, and hair loss. Finally, even if successful in inducing a 
remission, chemotherapy does not cure the underlying disease, and so 
after a period of two to 13 months, the leukemia usually returns and 
kills the patient. 
Although there was medical controversy as to whether Saikewicz 's 
age would impair the effectiveness of chemotherapy, facts before the 
court indicated that Saikewicz had a 30 to 40 percent chance of 
remission. 3 The court also noted that chemotherapy would require 
the cooperation of Saikewicz over a period of several weeks and this 
raised speculation that he would need to be physically restrained 
during treatment and constantly supervised. Finally, the court 
remarked that Saikewicz was not presently in pain and within weeks 
or months would die a relatively painless death without chemo-
therapy, but that such treatment would probably lengthen his life. 
The court decided against treatment and Saikewicz died in September, 
1976, from bronchial pneumonia, presumably a complication of his 
leukemia. 
B. Substituted Judgment Doctrine 
Since the court modeled the legal treatment of an incompetent 
patient after that of a competent one, and competent patients have 
the right in appropriate circumstances to refuse medical treatment, 
Saikewicz also had a right to refuse medical treatment. The court 
construed its decision for non treatment as being what Saikewicz 
would have done in an exercise of his right to privacy and self-deter-
mination. But, of course, Saikewicz himself could not have made a 
decision to refuse treatment, because he was incompetent. The court 
resorted to the substituted judgment doctrine to solve this difficulty. 
The substituted judgment doctrine is the court's attempt to "don 
the mental mantle of the incompetent" and "to substitute itself as 
nearly as may be for the incompetent, and to act upon the same 
motives and considerations as would have moved (the incompe-
tent). " 4 Using this doctrine, the court tried to place itself in 
Saikewicz's position and act as he would if he were competent to 
make decisions about his medical care. In doing this, the court had to 
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consider how Saikewicz would act while knowing that he would live 
out his life as an incompetent. In other words, the court tried to see 
Saikewicz's situation through his eyes as an incompetent, if competent 
to assess his situation, and this necessitated taking into account his 
continuing incompetency. There is no presumption that Saikewicz 
must be subjected to what rational and intelligent persons decline, 
since this placed a lesser value on his life. Evidence that most people 
would accept chemotherapy had no direct bearing on Saikewicz's case. 
While I have no criticism of using the substituted judgment doc-
trine, I question whether the court rigorously applied substituted \ 
judgment to Saikewicz so that it viewed considerations about non-
treatment from his perspective. In my discussion of the arguments 
against treatment and in presenting an additional argument for treat-
ment, I present examples of the lack of rigor in applying substituted 
judgment. 
c. Arguments Against Treatment 
In arguing against treatment, the court listed six factors favoring 
nontreatment and two favoring treatment. It concluded that the 
weight of the evidence favored nontreatment. As reasons against 
chemotherapy for Saikewicz, the court listed : (1) his age, (2) his 
inability to cooperate with the treatment, (3) probable adverse side 
effects of treatment, (4) low chance of producing remission, (5) the 
certainty that treatment would cause immediate suffering, and (6) the 
quality of life possible for him even if the treatment did bring about 
remission. 5 Of these six factors, only (2), Saikewicz's inability to 
cooperate with treatment, and perhaps (6), quality of life judgment 
which the court interpreted to mean the continuing pain and disorien-
tation subsequent to chemotherapy, were particularly relevant to an 
incompetent. As considerations favoring treatment, the court listed 
(1) the chance that his life might be lengthened thereby, and (2) the 
fact that most people in his situation, when given a chance to do so, 
elect to take the gamble of treatment. 6 While I do not dispute the first 
and sixth considerations for nontreatment, I have questions about the 
others. 
First, the list of reasons for nontreatment is redundant. Considera-
tion (3), probable adverse side effects of treatment, includes (5), the 
certainty that treatment will cause immediate suffering. Immediate 
suffering is just one of the adverse effects of treatment, not some new 
category.7 There are, then, only five distinct considerations for 
nontreatment. 
By (4), the court meant to say that Saikewicz had a 30 to 40 
percent chance of remission. The court imported a value judgment 
into this consideration when it called a 30 to 40 percent chance of 
remission low. There is nothing wrong with this value judgment except 
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that I see no accompanying argument justifying the application of 
" low" to this remission rate. These figures are low in the sense t hat 
they are less than 50 percent, but higher than if the remission rate 
were 10 to 15 percent. The judgment one m akes about these figures is 
also a function of whether or not one is afflicted with the disease. 
Until the court gives an argument why such figures are a reason for 
n on treatment, it is unclear that they count as evidence for 
non treatment. 
Consideration (2) against treatment was that Saikewicz would have 
been unable to cooperate with chemotherapy. This means, the court 
contended, that he would have experi enced confusion , disorientation , 
have been unable to anticipate and prepare for side effects of treat. 
ment, and consequently , would have suffered more from chem o-
therapy than a competent patient. No real evidence was given, how-
ever, that Saikewicz's pain would have been worse than a competent 
person's pain. While it may be true that a person who understands the 
reasons for pain is better able to endure it, it is possible that Saikewicz 
would not have suffered more than a competent patient. Moreover, 
since pain perception varies among individuals and may be related 
only indirectly to incompetency and the factors which the court cited, 
Saikewicz may not have suffered unduly. 
Good evidence about how painful treatment would have been for 
Saikewicz could have been obtained from a trial treatment for his 
leukemia. Treatment could have been stopped if he became uncon-
trollable or uncomfortable. It sh ould also have been possible to sedate 
him to reduce or control pain which may have been intermittent. Such 
a strategy would not have been cruel, particularly in view of the 
court's frequent mention of Saikewicz as a unique individual and the 
lack of good evidence that his pain would have been worse than that of 
a competent individual. 
A decision on the part of Saikewicz to tryout chemotherapy also 
would have been consistent with the substituted judgment doctrine. 
Since he had never been in this situation previously, he may have 
reasoned that some experience with chemotherapy might make him 
better able. to judge its risks and benefits. He could also have reasoned 
that this decision was reversible since treatment could be stopped. 
While a decision to begin a trial t reatment requires additional discus-
sion, the failure of the court to consider this alternative demonstrated 
a lack of rigor in app lying the substi tu ted judgment doctrine to 
d eterm in e h ow Saikew icz might have reasoned about his 
circumstances. 
But suppose it were t rue that Saikewicz would have fared worse on 
chemotherapy than a competent patient. What would such a compari-
son show, keeping in mind that the majority of competent patients 
who are informed of the side effects of chemotherapy, choose this 
treatment? If the majority of competent patients rejected such treat. 
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ment (and we knew that Saikewicz would have fared worse than a 
competent patient), then it is clear that we should not have subjected 
Saikewicz to treatment. But given that competent patients choose 
treatment, why should it have been a persuasive consideration for 
denying Saikewicz treatment that he would have fared worse than 
competent patients? This comparison tells us only the outcome of 
Saikewicz's treatment relative to another group, but it does not tell us 
how poorly - or how well - he would have fared. It is possible that 
treating Saikewicz still would have been indicated, even though treat-
ment would not have been as beneficial for him as for competent 
patients. 
Another problem with claiming that Saikewicz would have fared 
worse on chemotherapy than a competent patient is that we have no 
firm standard for the benefit of chemotherapy on competent patients, 
except that the majority of competent patients choose it. With any 
patient, a physician evaluates the benefit of chemotherapy by how 
well a patient responds. And a patient does likewise. In many cases 
chemotherapy is of questionable benefit, even for competent patients. 
We need to remember, then, that the court drew a comparison 
between something which is sometimes of questionable benefit 
(chemotherapy for a competent patient) and chemotherapy for a 
congenital incompetent. The question is, what can we learn from such 
a comparison? I do not think that this comparison gives us good 
evidence that chemotherapy would or would not have been beneficial 
for Saikewicz. Therefore, it is not a satisfactory consideration for 
denying Saikewicz chemotherapy. 
I have argued that there were only three considerations for non-
treatment of Saikewicz since (5) is a special case of (3). I have also 
questioned (4) as a reason for non treatment, because the court t 
presented no argument to justify the application of "low" to 
Saikewicz's chance of remission. Finally, I disputed (2), a comparison 
which claimed that Saikewicz would suffer more than a competent 
patient. Thus there remain only three considerations for nontreatment 
from the court's original list. Are there any additional reasons, other 
than the two which the court listed, in favor of having treated 
Saikewicz? There is at least one. 
D. An Additional Reason for Treatment 
An important consideration in favor of treating Saikewicz was that 
the decision to treat was reversible, whereas the decision not to treat, 
particularly with Saikewicz's leukemia where treatment had to begin 
immediately for any hope of success, would be irreversible. Treatment 
could have been discontinued if Saikewicz had shown avoidance 
behavior or behavioral signs of severe pain and stress. For example, if 
there was always a struggle when nurses cane to take him for treat-
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ment, it could have been concluded that he was suffering unduly and 
treatment could have ceased. As I suggested earlier, beginning treat-
ment would have shown respect for Saikewicz and his individual situa-
tion and given him an opportunity as best he could to express himself 
to us. 
Many may argue that a trial treatment of Saikewicz would have 
created difficult problems and it should not have been considered. 
Presuming that treatment would not set in motion irreversible side-
effects and biological processes in Saikewicz, there may still remain 
, objections. First, how much pain and suffering, on substituted judg-
ment of Saikewicz, was too much so that treatment should have been 
ended? Second, did treatment create aesthetic problems? Third, did 
beginning treatment of Saikewicz make it more difficult to stop when 
it was no longer in his interests? 
In answering questions about how much pain and suffering justifies 
ending treatment, we need to recognize that the measures for pain and 
suffering are imprecise. Uncontrollable behavior by Saikewicz at the 
sight of tubes and needles or the treatment area should have been 
sufficient, however. "Uncontrollable behavior" means behavior which 
cannot be managed by analgesics. The general issue here is when con-
tinued life is an injury to a patient. There is no positive duty to treat 
when the prospects of continued life are poor and the amount of pain 
and suffering is high. 
In dealing with aesthetic considerations about treating Saikewicz, 
we must remember that aesthetics may, but should not, cloud our 
assessment of whether to begin treatment. For example, there is the 
possibility that we may have to suspend a trial treatment and it feels 
different to suspend treatment than never to begin. Additionally, 
seeing an incompetent in restraints as intravenous tubes drip chem-
icals which cause toxic side effects would be dreadful. Saikewicz 
was not the kind of patient who satisfied our need to be healers. The 
emotional strains which such a patient places on doctors and nurses 
are possibly greater than in the case of a competent patient. None of 
this, however, is relevant to what might be the wishes of someone like 
Saikewicz, if competent, or what might be in his best interests. 
The final concern with beginning treatment is that we may mis-
takenly continue to treat someone like Saikewicz when it is no longer 
in his interest. We may come to feel, for example, that we can justify 
the previous pain and suffering of treatment only by continuing 
efforts to treat. Having criteria for suspending treatment and under-
standing that continuing treatment may be an injury to a patient 
should help to prevent a slippery slope. More important, however, to 
argue that the possibility of making a mistake is a reason for not 
beginning treatment would justify our never attempting any trial treat-
ments. The objections to a trial treatment, then, do not seem per-
suasive. 
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Adding the consideration that the decision to treat is reversible to 
the court's reasons for treatment would give us three considerations 
for treating Saikewicz. Earlier I had argued that there are only three 
considerations for nontreatment. Although now there is an equal 
number of considerations for and against treatment, there is additional 
evidence which helps weaken arguments for nontreatment. 
Saikewicz's familial, social and economic circumstances might have 
made treatment less of a burden for him than for a competent, non-
institutionalized patient. Since Saikewicz's sisters chose not to become 
involved when informed of his leukemia, Saikewicz may have reasoned 
that prolonging his dying by chemotherapy would not have placed 
emotional burdens on loved ones. Moreover, since he was a state ward, 
he may also have reasoned that his treatment would not be a financial 
burden to himself or his family, an important consideration for many 
noninstitutionalized patients. 
Additionally, since Saikewicz was institutionalized, his life was 
simpler than the lives of many competent leukemia patients who must 
severely restrict their activities. They also feel a deep change of body 
image as skin tone alters and hair falls out. Saikewicz, presumably, 
would not have felt these same restrictions of bodily activities, since 
he had not engaged in many of the activities of competent patients 
and it is doubtful that he would have anguished over a change of body 
image. Again, these considerations do not indicate how well Saikewicz 
might have done on chemotherapy. But by failing to consider these '] 
unique features of Saikewicz's situation, the court not only neglected 
to apply substituted judgment rigorously, but also neglected to see the 
weakness of its arguments for nontreatment. 
My analysis of the Saikewicz decision shows an equal number of 
considerations for and against treatment. With this balance - and 
probably even when the number of considerations is relatively close 
for treatment versus nontreatment - the court's m,ethod of consider-
ing the weight of the evidence to decide Saikewicz's fate failed. What, 
then, should have happened to Saikewicz? 
I think a treatment decision needed to be made in terms of a 
criterion for when Saikewicz's life was worth living. The Saikewicz 
court lacked such a criterion and simply talked about the weight of 
the evidence. This procedure works only when the evidence is unques-
tionably in favor of treatment or non treatment. Moreover, the conse-
quences of error in assessing the number of considerations for and 
against treatment loom large when the numbers are close. 
A proper criterion for treatment was that Saikewicz should have 
been treated if, and only if, the benefits of prolonged life ou tweighed 
the pain and suffering of chemotherapy. In assessing the burden of 
pain and suffering we need to consider the familial, social and 
economic circumstances as I earlier suggested. This criterion entails 
that we should have ceased treatment if Saikewicz were having pain-
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behavior unmanageable by analgesics, when bad days began to out-
number good ones and there was little hope for more good future 
days. If he were living a vegetative existence, maintained by tubes and 
needles, and there was little prospect that he would ever live again 
without such intensive care, then we should have found that the 
benefits of prolonged life do not outweigh the pain and suffering and 
ceased treatment. 
E.Conclusion 
While I do not think that the court's arguments supported nontreat-
ment, my arguments do not claim without qualification that we 
should have treated Saikewicz. In such cases, we should begin treat-
ment, always being ready to stop when we think that the benefits of 
continued treatment do not outweigh the pain and suffering of the 
chemotherapy. Beginning treatment is an attempt to go between the 
horns of the dilemma of either treatment or nontreatment and to give 
the patient an opportunity to express himself to us as best he can. 
Before closing, I would like to point out that I am not arguing in 
this paper for or against the sanctity of human life nor for a position 
that human life must be defended at all costs. I think there are many 
instances where dying is preferable to living with a body wracked with 
pain in the final stages of a fatal disease. But I do not see that 
Saikewicz would have become this kind of patient or that we would 
have needlessly maintained him with a trial treatment of chemo-
therapy. 
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